

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: ROTH/IKLE CONVERSATION ON VERIFICATION

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN
ACDA DIRECTOR IKLE AND FRG DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH
SEPT. 27 ON THE FRG FIXED POST VERIFICATION PROPOSAL AND
THE USG ANALYTICAL PAPER.

2. AMBASSADOR ROTH EXPRESSED HIS THANKS FOR THE "INTENSIVE
ANALYSIS" THAT HAD GONE INTO THE US PAPER COMMENTING ON THE
GERMAN PROPOSAL TO EMPLOY FIXED OBSERVATION OF DESIGNATED
EXIT AND ENTRY POINTS FOR THE NGA TO MONITOR A PHASE I MBFR
AGREEMENT. HE STATED THAT THE FRG MILITARY WERE STILL
ANALYZING THE US PAPER, BUT WERE WILLING TO SEE IT INTRO-
DUCED IN THE NATO MBFR WORKING GROUP IN TEN DAYS OR TWO
WEEKS.

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3. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO EXPLAIN THE GERMAN APPROACH TO NEGOTIATED INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS FOR A PHASE I AGREEMENT. A PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD NEED PROVISIONS FOR THE ENTRY OF PERSONNEL FOR EXERCISES AND AS REPLACEMENTS. PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF SUCH MOVEMENTS IS A NECESSITY, AND THEY WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PASS THROUGH DESIGNATED POINTS WITH FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS.

4. THE GERMANS WANT TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF WARSAW PACT OBSERVERS IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE NGA AND WOULD FAVOR PROPOSING A LIMITED NUMBER OF ENTRY POINTS FOR US FORCES. S FORCES CURRENTLY USE ONLY THREE (SIC) REGULAR ENTRY POINTS, PLUS A FEW MORE USED FOR REFORGER EXERCISES. ALL OF THESE ARE IN THE FRG, BUT THE GERMANS HAVE APPROACHED THE DUTCH AND BELGIANS WHO WOULD BE WILLING TO HAVE SOVIET OBSERVERS IN A FEW PORTS SUCH AS ROTTERDAM AND AMSTERDAM, EVEN IF THE US DID NOT ACTUALLY USE THEM FOR ROUTINE MOVEMENTS, FOR A TOTAL OF FIVE OR SIX ENTRY POINTS.

5. THE SOVIETS MIGHT NEED MORE ENTRY POINTS FOR THEIR FORCES, BUT WOULD THEN FACE THE DILEMMA THAT THERE WOULD BE MORE NATO OBSERVERS IN THE WARSAW PACT THEN PACT OBSERVERS IN NATO. AMBASSADOR ROTH SUGGESTED THAT FLEXIBILITY COULD BE INTRODUCED BY PERMITTING SOME MOVEMENTS THROUGH OTHER POINTS, WITH PRIOR NOTIFICATION AND THE RIGHT TO SEND INSPECTORS TO THAT POINT FOR A GIVEN TIME. THIS COULD ACCOMMODATE SOVIET NEEDS WHILE LIMITING THE NUMBER OF POSTS IN THE WEST.

6. THE GERMANS BELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEM OF MONITORING MOVEMENT THROUGH ENTRY POINTS WHERE NO OBSERVERS ARE PRESENT IS NOT A CRITICAL ONE BECAUSE ALL SUCH MOVEMENTS WOULD PER SE CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT. RANDOM INSPECTION OF SUCH POINTS MIGHT ALSO BE NEGOTIATED.

7. DR. IKLE COMMENTED THAT THE DETAILS OF PROVISIONS GOVERNING SUCH SPOT CHECKS WOULD BE CRITICAL IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE INSPECTORS COULD DETECT A VIOLATION. OUR ANALYSIS SUGGESTS THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT. EVEN THOUGH A POST SYSTEM COULD HELP DETECT RAPID VIOLATIONS, IT WOULD BE LESS EFFECTIVE AGAINST A SLOW, LONG-TERM

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BUILDUP.

8. AMBASSADOR ROTH RAISED THE ISSUE OF WHAT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE "FAMOUS NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS," COMMENTING WRYLY THAT IT WAS A LONG STANDING QUESTION. HE THEN SUGGESTED THAT AN AERIAL INSPECTION FEATURE MIGHT BE ADDED, GIVING THE INSPECTING COUNTRIES THE RIGHT TO A QUOTA OF OVERFLIGHTS TO LOCATIONS OF THEIR CHOICE, PERHAPS

WITHIN 6-10 HOURS OF NOTIFICATION TO THE INSPECTED COUNTRY.

9. AMBASSADOR ROTH THEN TURNED TO WHAT HE TERMED THE BASIC ISSUE: HOW MUCH VERIFICATION IS NEEDED TO DETECT A SIGNIFICANT VIOLATION, ONE LEADING TO A DANGEROUS SITUATION? HE SAW A DANGEROUS SITUATION AS ONE IN WHICH THE SOVIETS DELIBERATELY INTENDED TO BREACH THE AGREEMENT TO OBTAIN A MILITARY ADVANTAGE. ATTEMPTING TO VERIFY THE STRENGTH OF ALL THE FORCES IN THE AREA (NOT JUST US AND SOVIET) SEEMED TO AMBASSADOR ROTH TO BE A BOOKKEEPING JOB WHICH WOULD REQUIRE ENORMOUS EFFORT AND ONE COULD QUESTION HOW FAST IT COULD PROVIDE INFORMATION. HE STATED THE BASIC

ISSUE AS BALANCING WHAT IS REALLY NEEDED FOR VERIFICATION AGAINST THE RESOURCES REQUIRED.

10. DR. IKLE SAID THAT HE SAW THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM AS CONSISTING OF TWO PARTS. IN THE EVENT OF A RAPID BUILD-UP, WE WOULD QUICKLY NEED INFORMATION ON WHICH NATO CAN TAKE ACTION. WE MUST ALSO BE ABLE TO MONITOR AGAINST A LONG-TERM, GRADUAL INCREASE.

11. AMBASSADOR ROTH COMMENTED THAT A LONG-TERM BUILDUP OVER SEVERAL YEARS SHOULD BE DETECTABLE BY EXISTING MEANS. A SYSTEM OF FIXED POSTS AND SPOT CHECKS SHOULD GUARD AGAINST A LARGE-SCALE, RAPID INCREASE.

12. DR. IKLE COMMENTED THAT WE NEEDED TO KEEP IN MIND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR INTELLIGENCE TO DETECT A VIOLATION AND THE AMOUNT THAT MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO CONVINCE POLITICAL LEADERS. AMBASSADOR ROTH CONCURRED, AND SUGGESTED THAT A MULTILATERAL STANDING COMMISSION FOR MBFR MIGHT BE HELPFUL BOTH IN TREATY INTERPRETATION AND IN HANDLING COMPLAINTS OF VIOLATION.

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SUCH AN ORGAN MIGHT ARRANGE FOR INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE. AT THE VERY LEAST, IT WOULD PROVIDE A LOW-LEVEL ENTITY IN WHICH TO INITIALLY RAISE A COMPLAINT. DR. IKLE RESPONDED THAT THE PROBLEM WITH INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE IS THAT ANY EVIDENCE OF VIOLATION WOULD BE GONE BY THE TIME INSPECTORS ARRIVED. HE SUGGESTED, HOWEVER, THAT IT MIGHT BE TIME TO BRING THE STANDING COMMISSION IDEA UP IN THE MBFR WORKING GROUP. AMBASSADOR ROTH STATED THAT THE FRG WAS ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN THE STANDING COMMISSION CONCEPT AS PART OF THE VIEW THAT MBFR MIGHT BE AN INSTRUMENT FOR A BROADER, LONG-RUN DIALOGUE WITH THE OTHER SIDE ON INCREASING MILITARY STABILITY THROUGH APPROACHES THAT GO BEYOND REDUCTIONS.

13. AMBASSADOR ROTH THEN COMMENTED THAT MBFR VERIFICATION

HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT THE CABINET AND MINISTERIAL LEVEL, AND ALTHOUGH HE WOULD NOT SAY THE GERMANS WOULD "REFUSE" THEY WOULD BE "VERY RELUCTANT" TO ACCEPT PERMANENT AREA INSPECTION OF ENTIRE FRG. TEMPORARY INSPECTION WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE, BUT POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY NEEDED TO BE BALANCED AGAINST MONITORING CAPABILITIES.

14. DR. IKLE ASKED AMBASSADOR ROTH'S VIEWS ON THE TIME PERIOD IN WHICH DECISIONS MUST BE TAKEN ON VERIFICATION, AND ROTH REPLIED THAT THE PRESENT PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS INDICATED THERE WAS TIME TO WORK OUT VERIFICATION, PRIOR NOTIFICATION, AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION. LOOKING AHEAD, HE HAD HOPES OF "BREAKOUT" OF MBFR FROM THE NGA, AT LEAST IN THE APPLICATION OF STABILIZING MEASURES.

15. AMBASSADOR ROTH THEN REFERRED TO A GERMAN MBFR MONITORING STUDY UNDER WAY WHICH HAD PRODUCED THE INITIAL FINDINGS THAT TRYING TO MONITOR ALL RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS WAS A BOOKKEEPING EXERCISE REQUIRING TOO MUCH EFFORT AND THAT A SYSTEM SUCH AS THE FRG WAS PROPOSING COULD PROVIDE "FAIR VERIFICATION."

16. DR. IKLE COMMENTED THAT THE KEY QUESTIONS IN ASSESSING MONITORING CAPABILITIES WERE HOW LARGE A VIOLATION WOULD HAVE TO BE TO BE DETECTED, HOW FAST IT COULD BE DETECTED, AND HOW DEFINITE THE INFORMATION WOULD BE.

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IN NEGOTIATING, THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO DIVERT ANY INSPECTION NEGOTIATIONS INTO MONITORING ONLY THE WITHDRAWALS, WHICH WAS LESS IMPORTANT.

17. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WANTED TO RETURN TO DISCUSSION OF A STANDING COMMISSION IN THE FUTURE.

18. AMBASSADOR ROTH CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT THE FRG WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO MONITORING OF WITHDRAWALS; THAT THE GERMANS WERE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR A "FAIR CHANCE" TO DETECT RETURNS, AND THAT PRIOR NOTIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION WERE KEY ELEMENTS. MAW

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